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Staring at an Absolute Beauty 
Why Musical Scores are not mere Performing Instructions  
and what Literature can teach us about them 
Die in diesem Essay erarbeitete Fragestellung fusst auf einem musikontologischen 
Problem: Welche Art von Gegenstand ist ein Musikwerk? Eine wichtige Aufgabe der 
Ontologie der Musik ist es, die Konsequenzen der Einführung der Notation in eine 
musikalische Praxis zu bewerten. Zur Klärung muss unter anderem die Rolle verstan-
den werden, die der Partitur zugeschrieben wird. Mit diesem Essay möchte ich auf 
das, was ich als ernsthaftes Missverständnis der Rolle der Partitur betrachte, insbeson-
dere in Bezug auf die klassische Musik, hinweisen. Das Verständnis der Partitur als 
Spielanleitung, wie es in den letzten Jahrzehnten sowohl in der musikwissenschaft-
lichen als auch in der musikontologischen Literatur zu finden war, gilt es zu hinter-
fragen. In diesem Beitrag werde ich nach einem einleitenden Abschnitt zunächst 
sechs Argumente gegen die Vorstellung der Partitur als Spielanweisung formulieren; 
es folgen Kommentare zu einigen Passagen von Robert Schumann, Hermann Hesse 
und Peter Shaffer, um im weiteren Verlauf einen aktuellen Diskussionsbeitrag über 
die Rolle der Partitur in der klassischen Musik zu liefern.
In spite of relating both to music and literature, the argument I intend to 
develop in this essay is not driven mainly by a musicological or literary ques-
tion, but rather by a musical-ontological one, namely: what kind of entity is 
a musical work1? Without expounding on the details, the approach I adopt 
in my investigations on this subject is praxis-oriented, as I do not think it 
is possible to answer the question of the ontological nature of MWs inde-
pendently from the practices in which such works are composed, performed 
and consumed. One important task of a praxis-oriented ontology of music 
is to evaluate the consequences of the introduction of notation in a musical 
practice, and in order to do this one has to understand, among other things, 
the role played by the musical score2 in it. In this essay I would like to call into 
question what I consider to be a serious misunderstanding about this role, spe-
cifically in relation to the praxis of classical music.3 This misinterpretation, 
1 Musical work(s): henceforth abbreviated as MW(s)
2 Musical score(s): henceforth abbreviated as MS(s)
3 This expression is evidently vague and can be easily criticized. However, in this con-
text it can be adopted with no risk of damaging the argument I intend to develop. 
With the expression “classical music”, I refer to that musical praxis, dominant within 
cultivated music at least from Beethoven (Lydia Goehr talks in this respect of a Bee-
thoven-Paradigm) up until contemporary times, and characterized in relevant aspects 
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which in recent decades has gained significant popularity both in the musi-
cological and in the musical-ontological literature, consists in regarding the 
MS as performing instructions, or more precisely as “coded instructions that, 
when properly carried out, will enable performers not only to make sounds 
in a specific combination, called musical work, but also to repeat that combi-
nation as many times as they desire”.4
This article accordingly divides into four main sections:
1. In the first section, I intend on the one hand to show how the notion 
of a MS as performing instructions can support musical-ontological posi-
tions, which reduce (in different ways, as we will see) MWs to their perfor-
mances; on the other hand, to show that criticism of that notion of a MS 
does not entail any criticism of such ontological positions. 
2. In the second section, I formulate six arguments against the notion of 
the MS as performing instructions. Some of these arguments may indeed 
appear banal, as I will say many things which will sound obvious. But this 
is, in my view, a point against the thesis I am going to criticize.
3. In the third and fourth sections I briefly comment on some passages from 
Robert Schumann, Hermann Hesse and Peter Shaffer, in order to pro-
vide further arguments for my criticism, together with some hints about a 
plausible formulation of the role of the MS in the praxis of classical music. 
In these last two sections I will make use of some literature in order to 
argue for my thesis; nevertheless, I think that the points stressed in those 
passages are valid independently from the fact that they are highlighted 
there, as I believe that those passages sound convincing because the points 
they make are plausible (and not the other way around).
Introduction: the Musical Score and the Performative Turn
As a point of departure, I take the following considerations by Lawrence 
Kramer:
The musical score is iconic in classical music. Only with the score can fully 
composed music, musical works, be transmitted intact for realization in mul-
tiple performances. The score, one would think, is a wonderful invention. But 
in recent years the score has lost a good measure of the authority and prestige 
that once seemed to accrue to it automatically.5
on the one hand by the use of an increasingly detailed notation, and on the other by the 
more or less strict identification between Werktreue und Texttreue. See Lydia Goehr. 
The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works. 2nd edition. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007. P. 83, 121, 231. 
4 Christopher Small. Musicking. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1998. P. 112.




The situation described by Kramer does not seem to constitute a problem per 
se. The history of musical performance is replete with examples of musicians 
who can be legitimately regarded as great interpreters of MWs, in spite of the 
fact that their interpretations often do not strictly follow the corresponding 
MSs. 
This situation, however, becomes problematic when this loss of authority 
assumes a particular form, which in my view is a grotesque distortion of what 
the MS in fact is. We can see the extended passage from Christopher Small, 
partially quoted below, as an eloquent formulation of this distortion:
A score, of course, is not a musical work. It is not even the representation of 
it. It is a set of coded instructions that, when properly carried out, will enable 
performers not only to make sounds in a specific combination, called musical 
work, but also to repeat that combination as many times as they desire. Play-
ers and listeners learn to recognize that combination as a unity and to give it 
a name, which may be Symphony no. 5 in C minor or Rhapsody on a Theme of 
Paganini or Scheherazade, but the fact that this title appears on the cover of the 
score does not mean that the musical work resides in its pages. We find there 
only a set of instructions for performing.6
Without reducing the previous passage to a corollary of the musical per-
formative turn, it can easily be seen how such a view is functional to the main 
claim made by Small, which indeed expresses the main claim of the per-
formative turn (this being the aesthetic paradigm which imposed itself after 
and in opposition to hermeneutiCS) in the musical domain: namely, that 
the central element of musical activity is not the MW (as hermeneutically 
inspired music theories have argued), but rather the performance. Neverthe-
less, within this general claim some important distinctions can and should 
be made.
I propose to draw a rough distinction between a moderate and a radical 
performative turn in the musical domain. In the first case, the performa-
tive turn would amount to restating the centrality of performance in the 
6 Small. Musicking (as note 4). P. 112. As can be seen, Small in his work explicitly refers 
to the classical repertoire in order to illustrate his thesis about the role of the musical 
score as a simple performing instruction. In any case, classical music (see note 1 above) 
is often implicitly taken as a paradigmatic musical praxis also by those musical ontolo-
gies (some of which will be treated below) which have the ambition of characterizing 
the ontological status of MWs in general, and thus independently from the different 
musical contexts (see on this point Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works 
(as note 1). P. 83). So my arguments, whether or not they convince, cannot be invali-
dated as referring to a specific (and possibly exceptional) musical praxis, since exam-
ples from this same musical praxis are often used in order to demonstrate the thesis 
that I intend to criticize here. 
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musicological domain. Such a restatement is necessary because, as correctly 
stressed by Nicholas Cook, musicology has for decades been dominated by 
a reductive idea of performance, according to which its function was only to 
be true to the work as identified by the MS: 
Traditional musicology is like literary studies: it sees meaning, of whatever 
kind, as embodied in musical notation, from which it follows that perfor-
mance is in essence a matter of communicating that meaning from the page 
to the stage. The performer’s work becomes a supplement to the composer’s.7
Such a move does not entail per se any notion of the MS as mere perform-
ing tool. The author just quoted, in another text, differentiates very clearly 
between tablatures, which are actually performing instructions, and MSs, 
which are not:
Right at the beginning we need to distinguish two different types of nota-
tion, or more precisely, two ways in which notations can work: by represent-
ing sounds, and by representing things that performers have to do in order 
to make sounds. Although musical notations often combine them, these are 
quite different principles. The standard Western staff notation […] basically 
works by representing sounds.8
So we can already draw a first conclusion: there is at least one understand-
ing of the performative turn in the musical domain which does not entail a 
notion of the MS purely as performing instructions. Still, not all performa-
tive turns are moderate.
I use the phrase radical musical performative turn to refer to a specific 
ontological position which not only stresses the centrality of performance, 
but seeks primarily to reduce MWs to their performances. This, in other words, 
means saying that an MW is nothing more than the totality of its performances, 
or, in the case of musical stage theory, that every performance is a different 
MW (work-as-performance)  –  even though we can and do group some of 
them, according to different criteria, so as to construct a new entity (work-
as-construct) which corresponds to the implicit denotatum of our everyday 
notion of MWs. Caterina Moruzzi illustrates this in the following passage:
According to Musical Stage Theory musical works are performances. Every 
performance is thus a different work, even if, as I will explain, the act of group-
ing performances together according to a certain relationship also plays a role 
7 Nicholas Cook. Beyond the Score: Music as Performance. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013. P.10.




in our everyday notion of musical works […]. The only entities which populate 
the ontology of musical works are works-as-performances. The work-as-con-
struct is a collection of information and notions we have in respect to the work 
which allows us to have a certain level of knowledge about it. Yet, I do not 
consider it as an entity which deserves the ontological characterisation as work 
[…]. Barring cases in which an act of composition consists in a full-fledged per-
formance, a composition is merely a set of instructions necessary to performers 
in order to transform it into sounds […]. For this reason, unperformed musical 
compositions, if not works-as-performance, can be considered as part of the 
work-as-construct. They, or more specifically the set of instructions which is 
the only objective element which can be accessed, provide the audience with 
certain knowledge about the composition and can thus be included among the 
totality of elements which make up the general concept of work-as-construct.9
It seems prima facie that the very idea of reducing MWs to performances 
entails the notion of the MS as performing instructions. To put it briefly 
(and simply): if, strictly speaking, in the musical ontological domain there 
are only performances, MSs can only be performing instructions. But in fact 
such an argument is belied by the reality in two respects: first, the notion 
of MS as performing instructions has also been formulated by authors (like 
Peter Kivy, as we will see, and Nicholas Wolterstorff ) who adopt Platonist 
ontologies of MWs, and thus reside at the exact opposite ontological pole, 
we could say, to musical stage theory. Second, and even more importantly, 
the first formulation (at least in the domain of analytical philosophy) of a 
nominalist ontology of MWs, namely Nelson Goodman’s Languages of Art, 
according to which MWs are reduced to the totality of their performances 
(so a position quite different from musical stage theory, but nevertheless 
reducing MWs to their performances) quietly cohabitates with a notion of 
the MS, on which it is not at all conceived as a mere performing tool:
A score is commonly regarded as a mere tool, no more intrinsic to the fin-
ished work than is the sculptor’s hammer or the painter’s easel. For the score 
is dispensable after the performance; and music can be composed and learned 
and played “by ear”, without any score and even by people who cannot read or 
write any notation. But to take notation as therefore nothing but a practical 
aid to production is to miss its fundamental theoretical role. A score, whether 
or not ever used as a guide for a performance, has as a primary function the 
authoritative identification of a work from performance to performance. 
Often scores and notations – and pseudo-scores and pseudo-notations – have 
such other more exciting functions as facilitating transposition, comprehen-
sion, or even composition; but every score, as a score, has the logically prior 
9 Caterina Moruzzi. “An Alternative Account of the Ontology of Musical Works: 
Defending Musical Stage Theory”. Proceedings of the European Society of Aesthetics 8 
(2016): p. 321, 328-331, 333.
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office of identifying a work. From this derive all the requisite theoretic proper-
ties of scores and of the notational systems in which they are written. […] A 
score, as I conceive it, is a character in a notational language, the compliants of 
a score are typically performances and the compliance-class is a work.10
It seems that we can already draw out the following three considerations and 
a first conclusion, which should be read as the theoretical result of this first 
section:
1. The notion of the MS as performing instructions is functional to a radical 
(reductionist) version of the performative turn, but is not per se entailed 
by any theory of MWs (like Nicholas Cook’s) which highlights the cen-
trality of performance.
2. In some cases, the notion of MS as performing instructions has been for-
mulated within Platonist musical ontologies, according to which MWs 
exist independently from their performances (thus there can be unper-
formed MWs).
3. In some other cases, a notion of MWs reduced to its performances can 
cohabitate with a notion of MS, which does not confine it to the role of 
mere performing instructions.
It seems, therefore, that criticism of the notion of MS as performing instruc-
tions does not necessarily entail criticism of the performative turn per se, nei-
ther in its moderate nor in its radical form. This is the first conclusion to be 
drawn.
The Musical Score as Performing Instructions: Six Criticisms
In this section I develop several criticisms of the notion of the MS as per-
forming instructions. My ambition is neither to offer an exhaustive list, since 
other criticisms may well be developed in the (even near) future, nor to pro-
vide a definitive criticism of this notion – since everyone of them can be pos-
sibly evaded by appeal to some argument or another. The ambition of this 
section is only to provide a significant list of criticisms, drawing on very basic 
considerations. Some of them, as I have already anticipated, will sound obvi-
ous, and this is in my view a point against the thesis I am going to criticize.
Before starting, I would like to offer some considerations about the nature 
of the MS. As can be seen in Figure 1, a MS is not at all a simple object. It is 
constituted of at least three different elements (some other information con-
tained in the MS, like authorship or date of composition, will not be taken 
10 Nelson Goodman. Languages of Art. 2nd edition. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1976. P. 127-128, 173. 
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into consideration, as it is not relevant for the argument to be developed 
here):
1. The notes in staff notation.
2. Certain specifications related either to single notes or to phrases, or even to 
the whole MS: largo, pesante, forte, legato and so on.
3. Additional performing instructions related to the actions to be done in 
order to play the notes according to those specifications: fingerings, pedal, 
and others.
These three elements, as is evident even from a cursory glance, are not simply 
equivalent. That there is a sort of hierarchy between them can be understood 
by a thought experiment. We can imagine the score in Figure 1 with only the 
notes in staff notation, and without any specifications or performing instruc-
tions. This would be a rather parsimonious, yet still playable MS.11 On the 
contrary, if I eliminate Element 1 of the score, Elements 2 and 3 alone would 
make no sense at all. Without notes, it makes no sense to talk about legato, forte, 
pedal, fingerings and so on. All these are specifications of the notes to be 
played (how they should sound) and instructions about how to play those 
notes (how they should be performed). These considerations bring us to the 
first thesis: the notes written in the staff notation constitute the essential part 
11 Just to take an example: the Bärenreiter Edition of Das Wohltemperierte Klavier by 
Johann Sebastian Bach has no specifications or performing instructions (it does not 
even have fingerings). Still and all, it can obviously be played. More on this in the 
following pages.
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of the MS, i. e. the part without which a MS (at least in the musical praxis we 
are considering) cannot subsist. In my view, this thought experiment simply 
explicates something that is already implicit in our normal understanding 
of the MS, which can be formulated in a second thesis: the essential role of 
a MS is to tell us by which notes a MW is constituted rather than to provide 
instructions to performers. But in order to derive this second thesis from the 
first one, I have first to show that what is written in the staff notation are 
notes rather than performing instructions. The remaining part of this section 
(developed in six points) together with the next two sections seek to provide 
several arguments in order to support this second thesis.
An initial criticism about the notion of the MS as performing instructions 
can be developed by taking seriously some of the metaphors, which are often 
used in order to illustrate it. I take as examples two passages from Peter Kivy 
and Caterina Moruzzi:
The score is the master instruction, so to speak, from which all the other 
instructions are derived. It is like a recipe for a complicated dish from which 
the chef extracts a recipe for roasting the meat, a recipe for sautéing the truf-
fles, a recipe for preparing the sauce, and then assigns them to his associates.12
Reading the leaflet with the instructions to assemble a table may well be essen-
tial for giving the scattered pieces the shape and functionality of a table, yet 
we would not sit around the leaflet to have dinner with our friends. The same 
holds true for musical works: a musical work is a sum of sounds performed by 
respecting the instructions provided by the composer, it is not the composi-
tion itself.13
We can of course look for and find other metaphors. But it is interesting 
that both these metaphors share a common feature: in both cases, one can 
(and normally does) differentiate between the instructions and a picture of 
the final product (the cake, the piece of furniture). What we understand as 
instruction is not a picture of the product, but rather a description (in the case 
of a cooking recipe) or illustration (in the case of the IKEA leaflets) of the 
actions which must be undertaken in order to make it. The question we have 
to pose is the following: do we have a similar duplicity of denoted objects in 
the MS? Can we say that there are two distinct denoted objects, the action of 
the performer and the final product? Yes we can, and this is exactly the dif-
ference between Element 1 and Element 3 of a MS. But if this is so, we have 
to conclude, in accordance with our provisional statement, that the essential 
element of a MS is not that one related to the instructions, but rather that 
12 Peter Kivy. Introduction to a Philosophy of Music. Gloucestershire: Clarendon Press, 
2002. P. 205.




related to the final product: the staff notation seems to play the same role as 
the picture of the furniture in an IKEA leaflet, i. e. to provide an image of the 
final product.
This difference between the notes to be played and the actions to be taken 
in order to play them is clearly shown in Figure 2, which constitutes an illus-
tration of my second criticism. Here we have the same note sequence (Twin-
kle twinkle little star in C major), which can be played with a guitar (figure 
left) or with a ukulele in C. As you can see, the two tablatures (which, as 
correctly stated by Cook in note 6 above, are indeed performing instructions) 
are totally different, while the corresponding notes in staff notation are the 
same. Were MSs performing instructions, the notes in staff notation should 
also be different. 
For this same reason, and this is the third criticism, it is possible to play (to 
take a typical example of Hausmusik) a Bach Fugue for four voices with a 
string quartet (many other examples can be found or imagined). Were MSs 
performing instructions, a violinist or a cellist would have to read the key-
board instructions and, so to speak, mentally translate it, in order to make it 
work for a violin. The point is the following: in order to read one of the voices 
of a Bach fugue for piano, a violinist does not need to have any knoWLedge 
about pianos or keyboards at all, nor how a C or an A should be played on a 
piano. As trivial as it can sound, in order to play a piano score (or part of it) 
on a violin, a violinist just has to read the notes. There is no instrumental trans-
lation to be done. In fact, a Bach violin partita can be played on a keyboard by 
a person who hasn’t any idea about how to produce those notes on a violin. 
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This last point is even more evident in the case of a MS written for no 
instruments (the classical example being Bach’s The Art of Fugue). One 
can of course say that these are exceptions, but the point here is rather 
something else, and constitutes my fourth criticism: musical scores for no 
instruments can be composed any time, and such scores are playable and 
make sense. It is quite curious to notice, in fact, that the question of includ-
ing or excluding the instrumentation in the identity conditions of an MW 
is, at least since Jerrold Levinson’s article “What a Musical Work Is”14, one 
of the most discussed topiCS in the ontology of music. Were MSs perform-
ing instructions, the question from the outset would make no sense at all. 
If such a question could arise and survive in the ontology of music of the 
last forty years, it is because, nolens volens, there is an implicit understand-
ing of the MS as something which denotes not actions to be performed on 
an instrument, but rather sounds, or sounds-schemas (this point should be 
open).
This is evident also by the fact (the fifth criticism) that different perform-
ers playing the same MS on the same instrument (or kind of instrument), 
often perform very different actions. Different pianists use different finger-
ings, having different hand sizes, while some pedal indications written for 
the Hammerklavier of the early 19th century cannot be followed on a mod-
ern grand piano, etc. The same violin score can be performed in different 
positions, and this is a choice for the performer. In all these cases, when for 
example (referring to Figure 1) we have different pianists performing Cho-
pin’s first Ballade using different pedals and different fingerings, yet using 
the same MS, we are not saying that they are playing two different scores. We 
are saying that they are playing the same MS differently. They are performing 
different actions in order to realize the same product, as denoted by the notes 
in the staff notation.
The sixth and final criticism consists in noticing that notes in staff nota-
tion stand in harmonic, rhythmic and melodic relations. The discipline of 
musical analysis investigates such relations, among other things. As far as I 
know, I have never seen an action that was in C-minor, or an action which 
ought to be cantabile, or have some other character. Of course one can reply 
that “No, actually this is only a daily, pre-theoretical way of naming things. 
What is in C minor is not the object denoted by the MS, but rather the 
effect produced by the actions performed following the instructions there 
14 Jerrold Levinson. “What a Musical Work Is”. Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980): 
p.  5-28. See also Jerrold Levinson.“Authentic Performance and Performance 
Means”. Music, Art and Metaphysics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1990 P. 393-408. A peculiar position on this issue is the so-called timbral soni-




denoted”. And then, possibly, an endless, very complicated discussion can 
start, or maybe it cannot. My simple response is that such a statement ignores 
the fact that a musician reading a MS does not need to imagine something 
else (the effect produced by the denoted actions) in order to detect many 
qualities of the MW. Any student taking courses on music analysis, for exam-
ple, has to work out from the very first measures if an MW is, say, in C major 
or A minor. And he has to do that (in any case he can do that) by looking at 
the notes written in the score, not by imagining what would have been the 
effect of performing certain actions. Even a person who had never played a 
musical instrument, and had no knoWLedge of any of them, could detect 
such qualities. He could detect the difference between A minor and C major 
simply by analysing the score.
The fact that we can read a MS is indeed not only the final criticism I 
develop in this section, but also the consideration which allows me to pass to 
the next section, in which I intend to show how several passages from litera-
ture speak for a notion of a MS as something very different from performing 
instructions.
Reading a Musical Score: Three Lessons from Literature  
for Ontologists of Music
The first example from literature I take is the first article written by Rob-
ert Schumann (who was also one of the first music critiCS), published in 
the Allgemeine Musikalische Zeitung on December 7, 1831, and where Flo-
restan, Eusebius, and Master Raro – imaginary characters representing dif-
ferent aspects of Schumann’s personality – make their first appearance. This 
article is a review of Frederic Chopin’s Variations on “Là ci darem la mano” 
by Mozart. The passage I am interested in is the following:
Eusebius dropped by one evening, not long ago. He entered quietly, his pale 
features brightened by that enigmatic smile with which he likes to excite curi-
osity. Florestan and I were seated at the piano. He, as you know, is one of those 
rare musical persons who seem to anticipate everything that is new, of the 
future and extraordinary. This time, however, there was a surprise in store even 
for him. With the words, ‘Hats off, gentlemen, a genius!’ Eusebius spread out 
before us a piece of music. We were not allowed to see the title. I turned the 
pages idly; there is something magical about this secret enjoyment of music 
unheard. It seems to me, moreover, that every composer has his own musical 
handwriting [seine eigentümlichen Notengestaltungen für das Auge]. Beethoven 
looks different on paper from Mozart, just as Jean Paul’s prose differs from 
Goethe’s. Here, however, it was as if I were being stared at oddly by strange 
eyes-eyes of flowers, basilisks, peacocks, maidens. In certain places it became 
clearer – I thought I could discern Mozart’s ‘Là ci darem la mano’ being woven 
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through a hundred chords, Leporello winking at me, and Don Giovanni hur-
rying by in a white cloak.15
The last lines of this passage describe two operations that every person who is 
able to read a MS can execute by simply looking at it (see Figure 3):
a. We can recognize quotations of themes, melodies, or even rhythmic and 
harmonic patterns, even if they have to be executed by two different ins-
truments, such that totally different actions are needed in order to play 
them.
b. We can even recognize on paper some stylistic features of individual com-
posers, what Schumann in the above quoted text describes as Notengestal-
tungen (more literally translated: note configurations). Now, one does not 
have to blindly trust Schumann, even if he is probably better acquainted 
with music than 99% of musical ontologists, including myself. People fre-
quently have a wrong understanding of their own activities, and that is 
why philosophers feel entitled to tell them what they are really doing. But 
here the question is plausible independently from the authoritative voice 
which pronounces it. The musical style of a composer is, briefly (and sim-
ply) expressed16, a particular way his compositions sound, e. g. a particular 
predilection for some harmonic sequences, for some instrumental textu-
res, for some rhythmic patterns and so on. What you recognize in the MS 
is the graphical translation of these sonic patterns on paper, the staff nota-
tion being a sort of graphical mimesis of the relations between the sounds. 
Corresponding to an ascending melodic line you see in the staff notation 
a series of notes which form an ascending graphical line, and so on. And 
again, such a recognition of note configurations can be, even if not always17, 
independent from the instrument on which they should be played. So, to 
take a very simple example, the so-called “Bachian scale”, i. e. a descending 
melodic minor scale (so with the 7th and 6th grades raised by a semitone) 
is recognizable independently from the fact that it is to be performed on 
a bassoon or a violin. But the actions needed to perform it on those two 
instruments are totally different.
15 Henry Pleasants (ed.). Schumann on Music: A Selection from the Writings. New 
York: Dover Publications, 1988. P. 15.
16 Here we cannot even start a preliminary analysis of the notion of style in the musi-
cal domain. As before with the notion of classical music, we will assume a vague, 
pre-theoretical notion of style, without risk of damaging our argument.
17 The issue is that sometimes the style reflects a particular way of dealing with some 
instruments, a particular texture for strings in the orchestra and so on. But there are 
also stylistic features which are independent from the instrumentation, and this is 
the point I want to make here.
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Still one can argue that Schumann, in the above passage, could only make 
those considerations because he knew how to play the piano, so he mentally 
translated the instructions into sounds. However, as already mentioned before, 
one can easily detect several harmonic, melodic and rhythmic patterns in 
a MW without having played the musical instrument for which that MW 
was written, or even without having played any musical instrument at all. In 
order to reinforce this last point, let’s give the floor to Hermann Hesse, who 
in The Glass Bead Game develops an argument which constitutes an implicit 
answer to such objection: 
One who knows music only from the extracts which the Glass Bead Game 
distills from it may well be a good Glass Bead Game player, but he is far from 
being a musician, and presumably he is no historian either. Music does not 
consist only in those purely intellectual oscillations and figurations which we 
have abstracted from it. All through the ages its pleasure has primarily con-
sisted in its sensuous character, in the outpouring of breath, in the beating of 
time, in the colorations, frictions, and stimuli which arise from the blending of 
voices in the concord of instruments […]. We make music with our hands and 
fingers, with our mouths and lungs, not with our brains alone, and someone 
who can read notes but has no command of any instrument should not join in 
the dialogue of music.18
We can see here what every musician knows: even a person who has never 
played an instrument can read a MS. Not only that: he can also sing melo-
dies written for instruments he never played or never saw. This is really the 
18 Hermann Hesse. The Glass Bead Game. London: Jonathan Cape, 1971. P. 90. 
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symmetric situation for that of a MS written for no instruments (see previ-
ous section). Were MSs performing instructions, such a reading performance 
would not be possible. This seems to me quite a plausible inference. That is 
why a pianist who never played a lute can read a MS of a violin partita by 
Bach, but cannot read lute tablatures (which are performing instructions for 
lute) of the 16th century, even if related to less complex MWs.
We can pass to the next question: What is a person reading (or singing) 
from a MS if it is not performing instructions? I suggest that he is reading 
the notes which should be played by the performers (or in any case the series 
of notes which should constitute the basis for the performer in order to per-
form the MW). And this answer, as trivial as it might sound, is instructive 
also in order to understand our third literature example, where the question 
is not about reading or singing a MS, but rather of producing a MS under 
dictation:
SALIERI: Come. Let’s begin. (He takes his pen.) SALIERI: Confutatis Mal-
edictis. MOZART: We ended in F Major? SALIERI: Yes. MOZART: So 
now – A minor. Suddenly. (Salieri writes the key signature.) MOZART: The 
Fire. SALIERI: What time? MOZART: Common time. (Salieri writes this, 
and continues now to write as swiftly and urgently as he can, at Mozart’s dicta-
tion. He is obviously highly expert at doing this and hardly hesitates. His speed, 
however, can never be too fast for Mozart’s impatient mind.) MOZART: Start 
with the voices. Basses first. Second beat of the first measure – A. (singing the 
note) Con-fu-ta-tis. (speaking) Second measure, second beat. (singing) Ma-
le-dic-tis. (speaking) G-sharp, of course. SALIERI: Yes. MOZART: Third 
measure, second beat starting on E. (singing) Flam-mis a-cri-bus ad-dic-tis. 
(speaking) And fourth measure, fourth beat  –  D. (singing) Ma-le-dic-tis, 
flam-mis a-cri-bus ad-dic-tis. (speaking) Do you have that? SALIERI: I think 
so. MOZART: Sing it back.19
This passage is one of the most touching scenes of Peter Shaffer’s movie script 
of Amadeus. It can be criticized in various respects, starting from its truthful-
ness; and the romantic notion of Genius surely plays a very important role in 
the picture, which can be seen as a romantic and therefore inadequate read-
ing of the figure of Mozart. But this is not really relevant for the discourse 
I am developing here (and, as a matter of fact, I find such criticisms less rel-
evant in other respects as well). The point is that what is here described is, 
again, a very plausible scene. It is possible to dictate to a person by singing the 
notes they are to write in a music notebook, and we all expect that something 
similar to the above scene can be done in reality, with not much difficulty. 
19 Peter Shaffer. Amadeus, movie script based on the play by Peter Shaffer, 1984. URL: 




In fact, what is happening there is a very sophisticated form of melodic dicta-
tion, which is something that most students are required to learn in order 
to receive a music theory diploma. A melodic dictation consists in guessing 
which notes the teacher has played (normally at a piano). To do so, one writes 
down in one’s manuscript book the notes played, together with the tonal-
ity and the rhythm, without having to specify any instrument. You hear the 
notes, and you write them down. And this, substantially, is what is happening 
in the scene described above. Salieri can write the score, since he recognizes 
the notes Mozart is singing. He recognizes the notes, and he writes them 
down. As confirmation, we see that for the beginning of each musical phrase 
Mozart states the first note: “Start with the voices. Basses first. Second beat 
of the first measure – A”. “A” is not an instruction, but a note; and in fact it 
is the note which should be sung by the Basses. But he does not say what 
the Basses should do in order to sing it (which would be something like a 
performing instruction for singers). He says which note is the first note of the 
first Confutatis: “A”, and the rest of the phrase Salieri has to guess by Mozart’s 
singing.
Experiencing a Musical Score: How Musical Scores can Trigger 
Emotions
In the last section I tried to show how MSs can be, so to say, deciphered inde-
pendently from the performing actions necessary in order to play on spe-
cific instruments the notes written within them. In fact, we can read MSs, 
comparing them with other MSs written for other instruments, recognizing 
common configurations of notes, we can even read a MS for an instrument 
we have never played, and we can write MSs under dictation by listening to 
someone singing, or also by listening to someone playing some notes on an 
instrument we have never played. 
With my fourth and last literary example, again taken from Amadeus, I 
would like to provide a further argument for my thesis (that is: MSs are not 
instructions for playing MWs on instruments, but are, essentially, the graphi-
cal representation of the notes constituting those MWs), by showing how 
MSs can not only be read and understood, but also, so to say, experienced. By 
looking and reading a MS we can have not only a cognitive, but also an emo-
tional experience. We can be moved by it: 
(A pause. He puts out his hand and takes up the portfolio from the table. He 
opens it. He looks at the music. He is puzzled.) SALIERI: These are origi-
nals? CONSTANZE: Yes, sir. He doesn’t make copies. (CUT TO INT. OLD 
SALIERI’S HOSPITAL ROOM – NIGHT – 1823. The old man faces the 
Priest.). OLD SALIERI: Astounding! It was actually beyond belief. These 
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were first and only drafts of music yet they showed no corrections of any 
kind. Not one. Do you realize what that meant? He’d simply put down music 
already finished in his head. Page after page of it, as if he was just taking dicta-
tion. And music finished as no music is ever finished. Displace one note and 
there would be diminishment. Displace one phrase, and the structure would 
fall. It was clear to me. That sound I had heard in the Archbishop’s palace had 
been no accident. Here again was the very voice of God! I was staring through 
the cage of those meticulous ink-strokes at an absolute, inimitable beauty.20
F. Murray Abraham (the actor playing Salieri), by pronouncing the last 
words of this excerpt, almost bursts into tears: he is evidently deeply moved 
by the beauty he saw in the MS. However, the way this scene was realized by 
Milos Forman seems, in the first instance, to count against the argument I 
want to make: Salieri, in the corresponding scene, in fact imagines the sounds 
while reading Mozart’s scores. So again, we can assume that as an experienced 
musician he knows how the different instruments should have been played 
and in fact he translates the performing instructions in his mind. So, it seems, 
Salieri is not really moved by the experience of looking at a MS, but rather by 
the experience of imagining the sounds of the MW relating to that MS. And 
all this is totally compatible with the idea of MS as performing instruction.
But when we read the final lines of the quoted passage, we see that the 
point is much more subtle. The absolute beauty that Salieri recognizes in 
Mozart’s scores has to do with the notion of perfection: Mozart’s composi-
tion shows a structure in which every element is necessary and there is no 
redundancy. They are in this sense perfectly finished, with only the necessary 
notes in place.21 The point is that such formal qualities are much more visible 
than audible. The structural perfection of a Bach fugue can be appreciated 
much more by looking at the score than by listening to it. And in the case 
of very complex orchestral scores, the quality mentioned by Salieri is almost 
impossible (in any case very difficult) to discern by listening. And this visual 
appreciation can, in a second moment, have a deep impact on our auditory 
experience: we recognize the formal perfection in the sounds we listen to by 
recalling that visual experience, and we listen therefore with different ears, 
as only by looking at the score we come to realize that every element of it is 
strictly necessary. These elements are not actions, but notes and phrases that, as 
correctly stated by Salieri, are the very elements constituting the musical text: 
20 Peter Shaffer. Amadeus (as note 19).
21 Salieri, in this very passage, falsifies the famous criticism of Count Orsini-Rosen-
berg, reiterated by Emperor Joseph II in an important scene of the movie: “Too 
many notes!” Mozart’s answer in that scene is an equivalent formulation of Salieri’s 




“Displace one note and there would be diminishment. Displace one phrase, 
and the structure would fall.”
It is true that such emotions triggered by MSs cannot be compared to the 
emotions we can have by listening to their performances. But this does not 
mean that scores are therefore something other than music, that they are 
a simple practical tool. In fact, when we read a score, we do not necessar-
ily have to imagine something (as remarked before, we can just look at it) 
in order to appreciate some specific formal qualities, and we may even feel 
strong emotions in the very exercise of such appreciation. Still, if and when 
we imagine something by reading a MS, we normally are not moved by the 
imagined actions (when for example a musician reads a MS and imagines how 
to play it); rather, we are moved by the imagined sounds. I would therefore 
like to finish this article in the same way I started it, namely with another 
passage from Lawrence Kramer:
Although it is true that most listeners are not musicians, and that not all 
musicians read or work from scores, it is also true that for those who do “read 
music,” as the saying goes, the score is considerably more than a mere surrogate. 
It “is” the music no less than an individual performance is. The music exists 
not only as sound but as the sonorous image in the mind’s ear, and as the visual 
image on the page for those who know how to see the notation as a means of 
hearing. Scores are visual maps of acoustic possibility. The performer neither 
humbly “follows” the score nor proudly appropriates it. The performer ima-
gines the score. What makes this different from any other act of imaginative 
response is its medium. The performer imagines the score in sound.22
22 Lawrence Kramer. The Thought of Music (as note 5). P. 176. 
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